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Abstract: This paper refers to some social evaluation problems when equity matters. We propose here a way of  
assessing the equality of  opportunity that is applicable to categorical data. It consists of  dividing society into groups 
with similar characteristics and to measure the dispersion of  outcomes within those groups, from the distribution 
of  the population in the different categories. An empirical illustration on the equality of  opportunity in education 
is provided, using the PISA 2012 data on mathematical knowledge regarding the Spanish regions. 
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Igualdad de oportunidades con datos categóricos
Resumen: este trabajo aborda el problema de la evaluación social cuando la equidad es un aspecto relevante. 
En él se propone una forma de valorar la igualdad de oportunidades aplicable en contextos donde los datos son 
categóricos. Este método consiste en dividir la sociedad en grupos de características similares y medir la dispersión 
de los resultados entre dichos grupos, a partir de la distribución de la población en diferentes categorías. El trabajo 
incluye una aplicación empírica sobre la igualdad de oportunidades educativas usando los datos del informe PISA 
2012 sobre conocimientos matemáticos en las regiones españolas. 
Palabras clave: evaluación social, igualdad de oportunidades, datos categóricos,  PISA.
Clasificación JEL: I21, D63.
L'égalité des chances avec des données catégoriques 
Résumé: Cet article discute l'évaluation sociale du point de vue de l'équité. Pour ce faire, nous proposons une 
méthode pour valoriser l'égalité des chances avec des données catégoriques. Cette méthode consiste à diviser la société 
en groupes qui ont des caractéristiques similaires pour mesurer ensuite leur dispersion, à partir de la répartition de 
la population dans les différentes catégories. Cet article comprend également une application empirique concernant 
l'égalité des chances dans l’éducation en utilisant les données de PISA dans son rapport 2012, tout particulière-
ment sur les connaissances mathématiques dans les régions espagnoles. 
Mots-clés: évaluation sociale, égalité des chances, données catégoriques, PISA. 
Classification JEL: I21, D63.
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Introduction
The need to introduce distributive considerations in the analysis of  social 
outcomes is already well established. Income distribution, health, education, 
or human development are instances in which this concern has been syste-
matically incorporated from different perspectives (e.g. Roemer, 1996; Blei-
chrodt & van Doorslaer, 2006; Fleurbaey, 2008; Stiglitz, Sen & Fitoussi, 2009; 
OECD, 2010; United Nations, 2010). Equality of  opportunity is one of  the 
most relevant approaches to address distributive justice. There is a wide spec-
trum of  views with respect to what is required for equality of  opportunity, 
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from the non-discrimination viewpoint to the consideration that social pro-
vision should compensate for all forms of  disadvantage. Common to those 
views is that individuals are accountable, to some extent, for the achievement 
of  the advantage in question, whether this refers to health, education, inco-
me, utility or welfare. Indeed, the issue of  responsibility has become promi-
nent in some of  the recent developments within the areas of  political philo-
sophy and welfare economics (see Arnesson, 1989; Cohen, 1989; Fleurbaey, 
1995; Bossert, 1995; Bossert & Fleurbaey, 1996; Roemer, 1998; Fleurbaey, 
2008; and the literature cited therein).
The bottom line behind the equality of  opportunity principle is that 
people who are relatively disadvantaged due to external circumstances deser-
ve some kind of  compensation. And, complementarily, that we should not 
be concerned for those outcome differences that derive from other people’s 
characteristics that could be deemed irrelevant for the problem under consi-
deration. 
We propose in this paper a way of  applying the equality of  opportunity 
approach to the evaluation of  societies when individual outcomes are cate-
gorical (e.g. when the data that describe their achievements correspond to 
ordinal perceptions, positions in a ranking, or quality levels). To do so we 
start by grouping people according to their circumstances so that society is 
partitioned into a finite number of  types, each of  which gathers individuals 
with similar circumstances. In that way all people of  the same type share the 
same opportunity and therefore, outcome differences within types will be 
deemed irrelevant from an ethical viewpoint. The differences in the distribu-
tion of  individual achievements across types, on the contrary, can be regar-
ded as differences in people’s opportunities. This is the kind of  inequality we 
are interested in.
The novelty of  our contribution is that we provide a complete cardinal 
measure of  equality of  opportunity that is not based on decomposability 
principles (additive decomposability of  inequality indices, as in Ruiz-Castillo, 
2003; Villar, 2005; Lefranc, Pistolesi & Trannoy, 2008 and 2009 or Checchi 
& Peragine, 2010, or the decomposition of  outcomes between characteristics 
and returns, as in Bourguignon, Ferreira & Menéndez, 2007 or Calo-Blanco 
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& García-Pérez, 2012).1 Moreover, it is applicable to categorical data, a case 
in which only ordinal incomplete rankings are found, mostly based on the 
application of  Lorenz dominance criteria (e.g. Allison & Foster, 2004; Abul-
Naga & Yalcin, 2008; Zheng, 2011). 
The paper is structured as follows. Section 1 presents the reference mo-
del. Section 2 presents an empirical application out of  the last PISA data on 
fifteen-year old students’ performance regarding mathematics in the Spanish 
regions. A few final words in Section 3 close the paper. 
I. The model
Consider the problem of  providing an assessment of  the equality of  
opportunity for a society with m agents, M = {1, 2, …, m}, when individual 
outcomes are categorical. That is, there is a partition of  all possible indivi-
dual outcomes into a set C = {1, 2, …, } of  categories so that each individual 
outcome belongs to one of  those categories. Such an assessment will be re-
presented by an evaluation function, Iopp(.), a mapping from the set of  indivi-
dual realizations to the real numbers, which is to be interpreted as an index 
of  inequality of  opportunity. 
Our approach is based on the idea that individual outcomes depend on 
two sets of  variables that will be referred to as choice variables and environment 
variables. Choice variables are those that link outcomes with autonomous de-
cisions and can be regarded as an expression of  the agents’ responsibility. 
They are also known in the literature as effort variables. Environment variables 
refer to the agents’ external circumstances and may include aspects such as 
gender, inherited wealth, parental background, etc. They are also known as 
opportunity variables. 
Note that the division between those types of  variables involves com-
promises that affect the nature and the extent of  the evaluation, as it implies 
1 See, however, Almas et al. 2011, for a different approach based in the notion of  the Unfair 
Lorenz Curve. 
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deciding on those aspects for which inequality is relevant and those for which 
it is not. Two remarks are worth considering in this respect. 
First. External circumstances, in the sense used here, will typically depend 
on the problem under consideration. Take the case of  wealth, for instance. 
It may well be that wealth derives from people’s effort in many cases. Yet, 
when evaluating education or health, one usually assumes that wealth is part 
of  the external circumstances, in the sense that it is a variable that should not 
affect people’s outcomes in those respects (or, put differently, that education 
or health differences due to wealth are socially unfair).
Second. When applying the equity of  opportunity principle to specific 
cases one may find that not all variables that affect agents’ outcomes can 
be classified either as decision variables or environment variables. That may 
happen with some natural causes (e.g. age) or structural traits (e.g. social con-
ventions). When comparing societies with different patterns for those types 
of  variables, one has to find a way of  neutralizing those differences. Age is 
a case particularly relevant in the evaluation of  income, education or health 
because the outcome distribution is sensitive with respect to the age profile.
Suppose that, in spite of  all those difficulties, we have already solved the 
question of  which variables are decision variables and which ones are envi-
ronment variables. Let T = {1, 2, …, τ } denote the resulting set of  types in 
which the population is partitioned, according to the agents’ external circum-
stances. That is, all agents within a type have similar circumstances. There is a 
finite set of  relevant categories, C = {1, 2, …, }, that summarize all possible 
individual outcomes. 
A. The evaluation formula 
We want to assess the equality of  opportunity, regarding a given as-
pect, in a society made of  𝑚 individuals of  𝜏 different types that may 
produce outcomes belonging to one of  𝛾 different categories. The main 
idea behind our approach is that observed differences in the distribution 
of  individual outcomes across types reflect the different opportunities 
that people enjoy. 
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Let 𝑚(𝑡,𝑐) be the number of  agents of  type 𝑡 with outcome 𝑐,  the total number of  agents with outcome 𝑐 in society, 
and  the total number of  type-𝑡 agents. Call  the probabili-
ty that an individual of  type 𝑡 = 1, 2, …, τ will have outcome 𝑐 = 1, 2, …, γ. 
That is, . Let  be the vector of  population shares of  
the different types; that is, , with  and . 
Consider now the following matrix:
       (1)
Row t of  matrix A, denoted by α(t), represents the outcome distribution 
of  type t and is to be interpreted as an expression of  the differential effort of  
the agents of  that type. Column c of  matrix A, denoted by α(c), describes the 
distribution of  the categorical outcome c  across types. The differences in the 
probabilities within a column correspond in our framework to differences 
among types due to their differential circumstances.2 
The product πA = b yields a row vector of  γ terms, b =(𝘣1, 𝘣2, ..., 𝘣γ), each 
of  which describes the share of  agents with outcome c in the population. That is,
Our target here is to define a measure that captures the inequality of  
opportunity associated with a matrix A of  relative frequencies of  individual 
outcomes among a population consisting of  τ different types. Ideally, the dis-
2 Think, for the sake of  illustration, of  the case of  two types, rich and poor, and two health 
states, good or bad. The rows of  the corresponding matrix describe the distribution of  
health states for rich and poor people, respectively. The columns describe how good and bad 
health states are distributed between rich and poor. This type of  difference is the one that we 
associate with the inequality of  opportunity in society (here due to income factors). 
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tribution of  every outcome across types should be uniform. That is, in a fair 
society the differences in people’s external circumstances should not affect 
their realizations. As a consequence, the observed differences in the distri-
bution of  realizations across types derive from characteristics that involve 
diverse opportunities for the members of  this society. 
The inequality that is relevant for our purposes is, therefore, that within 
the columns of  matrix A, which describes the agents’ chances of  having a 
given categorical outcome depending upon their type. Clearly, there is no 
point in fostering an egalitarian distribution within a type, as those internal 
differences are, by construction, ethically irrelevant.
Given the distribution of  outcome c across types, α(c)=(α1c , α2c , ..., ατc ), we 
denote by i(c) the associated inequality measure, where i(.) is a relative inequa-
lity index applied to such a distribution. The inequality of  opportunity asso-
ciated with matrix A can be obtained as the weighted sum of  the inequality 
across categories, with weights equal to the corresponding population shares. 
That is, 
   ,   (2)
where i = [i(1), i(2), …, i(γ)] is a vector of  dispersion measures among the 
types by categorical outcomes. This inequality of  opportunity index can also 
be interpreted as a summary measure of  the differences between the rows of  
matrix A, which describe the distribution of  outcomes across types. 
Regarding the choice of  the appropriate inequality index, we propose using 
the index of  Atkinson (1970) for the value , which can be expressed as:
     ,    (3)
where  is the arithmetic mean and  the geometric mean. This index 
has several advantages: it is scale independent, has a range between 0 and 1, 
has a clear intuitive meaning and has been recently adopted by the United 
Nations as the standard to incorporate inequality concerns into the human 
development index (see United Nations, 2010 and Goerlich & Villar, 2009 
for a discussion on inequality measures). 
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B. Overall social evaluation and inequality-adjusted values 
In some cases, it could be interesting to get an evaluation of  the society’s 
overall performance and not only of  inequality of  opportunity. This can be 
done by means of  an evaluation function , which associates real va-
lues to social outcomes. A particular case is that in which we have a vector 
 of  cardinal values associated with the different categories of  
outcomes. Those values correspond to the weights attached to the different 
achievements in our evaluation. That is, each term qc  can be interpreted as 
the unitary contribution of  an agent with outcome c = 1, 2, …, γ to the to-
tal.3 Then, column vector d, given by Aq = d, provides an evaluation of  the 
average outcome of  the different types, conditional on the cardinalization 
scheme q. That is, 
The overall social evaluation of  society, derived from a matrix A and an 
evaluation criterion q, will be given by
         (4)
That is, 
The last expression states that our evaluation criterion is embedded in an 
outcome evaluation function, a mapping  which associates real 
numbers to categories taking into account their distribution across the diffe-
rent types. That criterion consists of  a weighted average of  the values of  the 
outcomes, with weights given by the corresponding population shares. Or, 
alternatively, it consists of  the weighted sum of  the evaluation of  the types’ 
average outcomes, with weights equal to the shares of  the population types. 
3 In some cases, particularly when dealing with categorical data, those values correspond to a 
particular cardinalization introduced by the analyst out of  some external source. When cat-
egories correspond to intervals, those weights may reflect a centrality measure of  the interval 
(mean or median).
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We can therefore identify  as the implicit evaluation of  outcome c, and 
 as the contribution of  type t to aggregate value. 
We can combine the evaluation of  social outcomes and the assessment 
of  the equality of  opportunity in a single measure, H(.), that describes the 
inequality-adjusted evaluation function. This measure can be defined as follows: 
       (5)
That is, function H(.) applies a discount to the overall evaluation of  social 
outcomes, , equal to the weighted inequality across types (the inequality 
of  opportunity index). The term  describes the total amount of  
such a reduction.
From that expression, we can estimate the relative social loss due to the 
inequality of  opportunity, , as the ratio between the social loss, 
, and the inequality-adjusted social evaluation, H A, q, i( ) ; that is,
        (6)
This expression gives us the share of  the social value that is lost due to 
the inequality of  opportunity. Interestingly enough, equation 6 turns out to 
be independent of  the cardinalization assumed. That is, we can have a mea-
sure of  the relative social loss without actually knowing the social evaluation 
function. Even though the information provided by equations 2 and 5 is 
equivalent, the figures in expression 5 are usually easier to interpret.
II. An empirical illustration: Inequality of opportunity in scholastic 
performance in the Spanish regions according to PISA 2012
To illustrate the workings of  this evaluation method, we analyse the in-
equality of  opportunity in scholastic performance of  fifteen-year old Spanish 
students using the latest wave of  the Programme for International Student 
Assessment (PISA), focussing on mathematical knowledge. PISA is a triennial 
worldwide test of  15-year-old schoolchildren’s scholastic performance, the 
implementation of  which is coordinated by the OECD. The survey provides 
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information about the students’ test scores and their personal background, 
learning habits, attitudes, engagement and motivation, and characteristics of  
their schools. It provides information on the students’ ability in three diffe-
rent domains: reading comprehension, mathematics, and science. Every pe-
riod of  assessment specialises in one particular category, but it also tests the 
other two. The subject specialisation is rotated through each PISA wave. The 
2012 report focuses on mathematics. See OECD (2013) for details.
Most of  the Spanish regions have produced an enhanced sample of  
PISA so that they have statistically significant data at the regional level, which 
allows making comparisons among them.4 In order to get an estimate of  the 
inequality of  opportunity in the educational systems of  the Spanish regions, 
we define the types and categories correspondent to the model above as fo-
llows. Types are given by the deciles of  the distribution of  the PISA Index of  
Economic, Social and Cultural Status (IESCS). This index combines information 
on parents’ education and occupations and home possessions. Regarding ca-
tegories, we take the distribution of  the students’ outcomes in the five levels of  
competence defined by PISA after aggregating levels 5 and 6 into a single one.5
Our data are thus given by thirteen matrices, as there are thirteen Spanish 
regions with relevant data, each consisting of  ten rows and five columns. 
Rows correspond to the deciles of  the distribution of  the IESCS and co-
lumns to the level of  competence. That is, the term  corresponds to the 
share of  agents in the decile t with competence level c in region i. Those data 
are incorporated into the Appendix. 
Table 1 contains information regarding inequality of  opportunity by le-
vels of  competence in the different regions. It is interesting to observe a com-
mon pattern between the regions: higher inequality of  opportunity occurs at 
both the highest and the lowest level of  competence. Yet the regions behave 
rather differently, as the coefficient of  variation shows. The higher diversity 
4 The only regions without statistically significant data in 2012 are Canarias, Castilla La Mancha 
and Comunidad Valenciana. Those of  Extremadura were incorporated later in the report.
5 Those levels of  competence are qualitative in nature, even though they are parameterized by 
some thresholds of  the test scores. 
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also occurs at the highest level of  competence, whereas the smaller one ap-
pears at the lowest level of  competence. Andalusia, the Balearic Islands and 
Murcia show the highest inequality values for level 5 but rather low inequality 
at level 1. Navarre and the Basque Country exhibit very low inequality in both 
extremes. Catalonia and Madrid show mild inequality on both levels. 




1 2 3 4 5
Andalusia 0.142 0.034 0.028 0.171 1.000
Aragon 0.207 0.024 0.017 0.112 0.164
Asturias 0.242 0.045 0.012 0.064 0.252
Balearic Islands 0.144 0.016 0.028 0.090 1.000
Cantabria 0.119 0.057 0.010 0.055 0.314
Castille and León 0.188 0.059 0.012 0.076 0.212
Catalonia 0.236 0.057 0.019 0.156 0.262
Galicia 0.112 0.043 0.011 0.053 0.253
La Rioja 0.191 0.051 0.019 0.052 0.204
Madrid 0.200 0.050 0.008 0.086 0.227
Murcia 0.143 0.016 0.032 0.138 1.000
Navarre 0.128 0.081 0.015 0.039 0.260
Basque Country 0.140 0.032 0.003 0.059 0.213
Mean 0.169 0.043 0.016 0.089 0.412
Coeff. of Variation 0.262 0.431 0.525 0.483 0.817
Source: OECD (2013) and own elaboration
 
Table 2 provides the overall measure of  Inequality of  Opportunity pro-
posed and relates it to some other variables. The first two columns of  the 
table give information about the Inequality of  Opportunity index (Iopp), 
both in absolute terms and relative to the mean. This second column permits 
one to both visualize easily the rapport with the mean and to compare the 
Iopp with another inequality index that appears in columns 3 and 4. This 
index is the coefficient of  determination (the square of  the linear coefficient 
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of  correlation) relating test scores and values of  the IESCS. This is one of  
the inequality measures used by the OECD in order to assess the equity of  
educational systems. Even though the correlation between both measures is 
positive and relatively important (0.68), the data show that our Iopp measure 
discriminates more than the coefficient of  determination and that there are 
some regions changing from above to below the corresponding average (Ba-
learic Islands, La Rioja and Madrid).
Table 2. Inequality of opportunity and relative social loss in the Spanish educational sys-

















Andalucía 0.107 1.328 0.16 1.159 472 12
Aragón 0.082 1.026 0.157 1.138 496 9
Asturias 0.081 1.008 0.156 1.130 500 9
Baleares 0.085 1.054 0.125 0.906 475 9
Cantabria 0.067 0.839 0.105 0.761 491 7
Castilla y León 0.071 0.880 0.12 0.870 509 8
Cataluña 0.102 1.267 0.175 1.268 493 11
Galicia 0.078 0.975 0.1 0.725 489 8
La Rioja 0.078 0.975 0.154 1.116 503 8
Madrid 0.074 0.928 0.16 1.159 504 8
Murcia 0.097 1.214 0.146 1.058 462 11
Navarra 0.070 0.867 0.128 0.928 517 7
País Vasco 0.051 0.638 0.105 0.761 505 5
Coeff. Variation 0.188 0.182 0.032 0.204
Source: OECD (2013) and own elaboration 
Column 5 provides the average test scores in order to compare perfor-
mance and equity. The good news is that there is no trade-off  between both 
aspects. Indeed, the coefficient of  correlation between Inequality of  Op-
portunity and test scores is -0.69 (even higher, in absolute terms, than the 
correlation between Iopp and R2). The correlation between test scores and 
the coefficient of  determination is also negative, but much smaller (-0.13). It 
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is worth noting that the coefficient of  variation of  the inequality of  opportu-
nity is almost six times higher than that of  the test scores (see the values of  
the coefficient of  variation in the last row). 
The last column of  the table provides the estimate of  the relative social 
loss due to inequality of  opportunity. Andalusia, Catalonia and Murcia, which 
are the regions with higher inequality of  opportunity, show social losses abo-
ve 10 %. In the other extreme we find Cantabria, Navarre and the Basque 
Country with values below 7 %.
III. Final remarks
Equality of  opportunity is a powerful evaluation principle of  the highest 
pertinence when dealing with such essential aspects of  life as income, health 
or education. Applying this principle usually requires a number of  compro-
mises and case-specific adaptations that determine the extent and relevance 
of  the analysis. Those difficulties increase when the original data are catego-
rical.
 We have presented in this paper a model for the evaluation of  equality 
of  opportunity applicable to the case in which outcomes can be categorical. 
The key idea is that of  partitioning society in a finite set of  types that collect 
agents with the same relevant circumstances and then compare the frequency 
distribution of  the realizations across types. 
When categories can be given a cardinal evaluation, we can also provi-
de an overall evaluation of  society’s performance taking into account both 
average levels and inequality of  opportunity. One may reasonably argue that 
such an evaluation becomes fully dependent on the weighting system of  ca-
tegories, which may derive from different sources or admit a number of  al-
ternatives. Yet it is worth noting that the analysis of  equality of  opportunity 
is independent on any cardinal valuation of  the categories, which makes this 
analysis very robust.
In a complementary line of  research, the authors have developed a mo-
del for the analysis of  categorical data with an endogenous weighting system 
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(see Herrero & Villar, 2013) permitting one to address this problem from a 
slightly different viewpoint (see Herrero, Méndez & Villar, 2014). The key 
difference is that the model presented here provides a summary measure of  
inequality of  opportunity for the whole society, as an aggregate of  inequality 
of  opportunity in the different categories, whereas in those papers equality 
of  opportunity only allows comparing the relative opportunity values of  the 
different types. Both lines of  research are, therefore, complementary. 
References
Abul-Naga, Ramses & Yalcin, Tarik (2008). “Inequality measurement for 
ordered response health data”, Journal of Health Economics, Vol. 27, pp. 
1614-1625.
Allison, R. Andrew & Foster, James (2004). “Measuring Health Inequality 
Using Qualitative Data”, Journal of Health Economics, Vol. 23, Issue 3, 
pp. 505-524. 
Arneson, Richard (1989). “Equality and equal opportunity for welfare”, 
Philosophical Studies, Vol. 56, pp. 159–194.
Almas, Ingvild; Cappelen, Alexander; Lind, Jo Thori; Sorensen, Erik & 
Tungodden, Bertil (2011). “Measuring unfair (in)equality”, Journal of 
Public Economics, Vol. 95, Issue 7-8, pp. 488-499.
Bleichrodt, Han & van Doorslaer, Eddy (2006). “A welfare economics 
foundation for health inequality measurement”, Journal of Health Econo-
mics, Vol. 25, Issue 5, pp. 945-957. 
Bossert, Walter (1995). “Redistribution mechanisms based on individual 
characteristics”, Mathematical Social Sciences, Vol. 29, pp. 1–17.
Bossert, Walter & Fleurbaey, Marc (1996). “Redistribution and compensa-
tion”, Social Choice and Welfare, Vol. 13, Issue 3, pp. 343–355. 
24
Herrero and Villar: Equality of  opportunity with categorical data
Bourguignon, François; Ferreira, Francisco H. & Menéndez, Mar-
ta (2007). “Inequality of opportunity in Brazil”, Review of Income and 
Wealth, Vol. 53, Issue 4, pp. 585–618. 
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APPENDIX: Distribution of the population of students in the Spanish regions 
by deciles of IESCS and levels of competence6
Andalusia
1 2 3 4 5
0.408 0.354 0.197 0.041 0.000
0.305 0.440 0.170 0.078 0.007
0.299 0.361 0.272 0.054 0.014
0.248 0.355 0.305 0.092 0.000
0.189 0.399 0.273 0.119 0.021
0.162 0.317 0.359 0.141 0.021
0.156 0.333 0.362 0.113 0.035
0.152 0.290 0.345 0.179 0.034
0.056 0.231 0.343 0.287 0.084
0.076 0.160 0.333 0.306 0.125
Aragon
1 2 3 4 5
0.417 0.309 0.194 0.058 0.022
0.299 0.255 0.277 0.146 0.022
0.246 0.289 0.289 0.141 0.035
0.156 0.193 0.356 0.237 0.059
0.147 0.213 0.382 0.221 0.037
0.080 0.248 0.350 0.263 0.058
0.078 0.220 0.262 0.326 0.113
0.044 0.228 0.265 0.353 0.110
0.084 0.161 0.287 0.350 0.119
0.082 0.150 0.340 0.340 0.088
Asturias
1 2 3 4 5
0.270 0.374 0.227 0.104 0.025
0.258 0.321 0.270 0.132 0.019
0.162 0.329 0.341 0.138 0.030
0.158 0.272 0.304 0.190 0.076
0.156 0.269 0.338 0.206 0.031
0.082 0.314 0.352 0.195 0.057
0.108 0.190 0.411 0.222 0.070
0.113 0.225 0.338 0.238 0.088
0.024 0.154 0.320 0.331 0.172
0.019 0.146 0.285 0.348 0.203
6 All the tables in this Appendix have been elaborated by the authors, from the data provided 
by the OECD (2013) vols. I and II.
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Balearic Islands
1 2 3 4 5
0.368 0.347 0.208 0.069 0.007
0.393 0.290 0.214 0.097 0.007
0.262 0.345 0.290 0.083 0.021
0.203 0.297 0.304 0.196 0.000
0.150 0.314 0.286 0.200 0.050
0.184 0.286 0.299 0.211 0.020
0.128 0.248 0.411 0.191 0.021
0.092 0.284 0.369 0.227 0.028
0.064 0.213 0.461 0.248 0.014
0.105 0.190 0.333 0.275 0.098
Cantabria
1 2 3 4 5
0.320 0.314 0.229 0.118 0.020
0.219 0.311 0.318 0.132 0.020
0.192 0.377 0.245 0.166 0.020
0.199 0.371 0.258 0.146 0.026
0.183 0.320 0.327 0.150 0.020
0.159 0.258 0.351 0.192 0.040
0.098 0.366 0.327 0.170 0.039
0.107 0.228 0.336 0.268 0.060
0.046 0.151 0.336 0.309 0.158
0.088 0.126 0.296 0.308 0.182
Castille and Leon
1 2 3 4 5
0.262 0.335 0.274 0.091 0.037
0.162 0.364 0.260 0.188 0.026
0.106 0.319 0.375 0.181 0.019
0.086 0.247 0.426 0.191 0.049
0.106 0.250 0.381 0.238 0.025
0.076 0.236 0.357 0.255 0.076
0.037 0.221 0.325 0.331 0.086
0.052 0.162 0.377 0.312 0.097
0.038 0.146 0.306 0.401 0.108
0.037 0.112 0.292 0.379 0.180
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Catalonia
1 2 3 4 5
0.382 0.340 0.208 0.056 0.014
0.238 0.329 0.343 0.063 0.028
0.223 0.338 0.264 0.149 0.027
0.120 0.408 0.289 0.162 0.021
0.177 0.284 0.369 0.156 0.014
0.090 0.262 0.386 0.234 0.028
0.072 0.216 0.367 0.295 0.050
0.049 0.160 0.403 0.319 0.069
0.028 0.156 0.383 0.348 0.085
0.074 0.149 0.277 0.345 0.155
Galicia
1 2 3 4 5
0.299 0.305 0.286 0.097 0.013
0.258 0.290 0.271 0.168 0.013
0.208 0.318 0.318 0.143 0.013
0.192 0.385 0.269 0.135 0.019
0.221 0.266 0.305 0.175 0.032
0.137 0.268 0.353 0.176 0.065
0.096 0.223 0.420 0.229 0.032
0.088 0.238 0.347 0.259 0.068
0.071 0.200 0.374 0.265 0.090
0.083 0.115 0.395 0.306 0.102
La Rioja
1 2 3 4 5
0.354 0.291 0.196 0.127 0.032
0.275 0.336 0.208 0.141 0.040
0.222 0.288 0.275 0.163 0.052
0.142 0.271 0.258 0.226 0.103
0.133 0.253 0.313 0.233 0.067
0.135 0.219 0.342 0.271 0.032
0.094 0.188 0.336 0.282 0.101
0.077 0.160 0.372 0.288 0.103
0.053 0.127 0.267 0.347 0.207
0.038 0.127 0.268 0.338 0.229
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Madrid
1 2 3 4 5
0.299 0.351 0.234 0.104 0.013
0.247 0.292 0.305 0.136 0.019
0.181 0.331 0.306 0.156 0.025
0.121 0.275 0.389 0.188 0.027
0.113 0.294 0.344 0.213 0.038
0.074 0.196 0.338 0.304 0.088
0.047 0.180 0.373 0.353 0.047
0.052 0.155 0.316 0.387 0.090
0.064 0.128 0.333 0.359 0.115
0.045 0.192 0.321 0.327 0.115
Murcia
1 2 3 4 5
0.479 0.300 0.164 0.050 0.007
0.314 0.343 0.241 0.095 0.007
0.324 0.388 0.173 0.094 0.022
0.286 0.353 0.301 0.060 0.000
0.236 0.354 0.313 0.083 0.014
0.167 0.409 0.303 0.098 0.023
0.219 0.277 0.285 0.161 0.058
0.117 0.314 0.321 0.204 0.044
0.085 0.298 0.397 0.163 0.057
0.075 0.209 0.313 0.313 0.090
Navarre
1 2 3 4 5
0.242 0.340 0.248 0.150 0.020
0.115 0.293 0.344 0.197 0.051
0.155 0.270 0.358 0.182 0.034
0.137 0.203 0.379 0.248 0.033
0.071 0.221 0.409 0.253 0.045
0.072 0.243 0.289 0.303 0.092
0.061 0.196 0.318 0.324 0.101
0.065 0.110 0.368 0.348 0.110
0.045 0.117 0.305 0.364 0.169
0.058 0.090 0.231 0.346 0.276
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Basque Country
1 2 3 4 5
0.244 0.341 0.305 0.097 0.013
0.149 0.295 0.362 0.169 0.025
0.143 0.285 0.360 0.179 0.033
0.121 0.281 0.366 0.206 0.026
0.087 0.267 0.350 0.241 0.055
0.096 0.234 0.376 0.256 0.037
0.061 0.213 0.369 0.285 0.072
0.056 0.177 0.321 0.364 0.082
0.028 0.147 0.360 0.326 0.140
0.109 0.175 0.297 0.306 0.113
